Should we treat non-human animals well because they have rights, interests, neither, or both?

There is a broad consensus that we should treat non-human animals well. Many countries have strict laws in place to protect animal lives. When it comes to why we should treat them that way, different opinions are around the corner. In this essay, I argue that we must treat animals well not because they possess “rights” in the human sense, but because they have interests—and because ecological balance and sustainability demand it.

By “rights,” I do not refer to the everyday umbrella term often used without critical reflection. Rather, I mean “rights” as Right, a normative framework grounded in human society. This understanding of Right is shaped by legal, cultural, and philosophical systems, and its notion has been proposed, argued, and solidified through the efforts of our human pioneers. This Right is impossible to apply meaningfully across the diversity of non-human life, and it is unfair to do so. However, the notion of interests, the capacity to suffer or flourish, and the reality of ecological interdependence provide a more practical and morally consistent foundation for how we should treat animals.

How is interest different from Right? As Jeremy Bentham famously asked, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” This capacity for suffering is universal across many species (mammals, birds, and even some invertebrates), and it creates a moral imperative to minimize unnecessary harm. What it means to “suffer” lies in the essence of interest—the need and desire to do something. When the need cannot be satisfied, there is possibly suffering. Specifically, in the case of animal protection, they have an interest in avoiding pain, pursuing pleasure, and securing food and shelter. This is solely associated with their ability to feel something—an ability that is given by birth and granted by the Creator or God and is inalienable.

Philosopher Tom Regan, in The Case for Animal Rights, argues that many animals are “subjects-of-a-life”—they have beliefs, desires, a sense of the future, and the capacity to feel pain and pleasure. While Regan uses this subjecthood to claim that such animals deserve inherent rights, his insight can also support an interest-based view. The very things that make an animal a “subject-of-a-life” are the same things that give rise to interests: the need to avoid pain, find food and shelter, and experience comfort. Even if we reject the framework of rights, we can still see that animals have moral interests simply because they are sentient beings. In fact, interests rather than rights avoid drawing arbitrary lines between species and is a broader more inclusive approach to animal welfare. Under this framework, we can therefore see that many cases can be examined and explained; for example, animal testing and farming practices must be evaluated through the lens of interests—not rights. If animals have a clear interest in avoiding pain, then any use of them that causes suffering must be morally justified by a stronger, unavoidable human interest. For instance, life-saving medical research involving animal testing may be justifiable because the human interest in survival outweighs the harm done. But cosmetic testing or trivial experiments fail this test—these serve human whims at the cost of animal suffering. And factory farming, which confines animals to tiny painful spaces for maximum efficiency, clearly violates their basic interest in movement, comfort and freedom from suffering. The interest-based approach thus creates a clear moral line: necessary harm may sometimes be justified, but needless harm never is.

Critics argue that animals with complex cognition—such as mammals and birds—are “subjects-of-a-life” and therefore possess inherent rights, much like infants or cognitively disabled humans, who also lack rational agency but are still granted rights. However, I argue that this kind of right is not the same as the concept of Right as it applies to human society. The idea of human rights did not emerge in a vacuum. It was born from conflict and injustice—colonialism, slavery, racism, and war. Human rights were not simply granted because all humans were seen as naturally equal; rather, they were hard-won principles designed to restrain the destructive capacities of humans themselves. The notion of rights is deeply embedded in a history of violence and power, and in a need to prevent humans from abusing each other. Without this concept, bolstered by the mythical authority of monarchy and the blinding illusion of glory, humans believed they had the absolute right to dominate and destroy. In modern society, rights function within a social contract—we grant rights to others, expecting reciprocal respect in return. But animals cannot participate in such a system. They cannot demand rights, fight back, or seek justice. To force them into this human-made framework—one rooted in violence and negotiation—is both inappropriate and unfair. There is no need to draw animals into the human “game” of rights, which they cannot meaningfully engage in.

Peter Singer, in Animal Liberation, also rejects the idea of animal rights but emphasizes a strong moral obligation to reduce animal suffering. Singer argues that animals may not have rights in the legal or philosophical sense, but because they can suffer, their interests must be weighed equally with human interests. An animal’s pain matters morally the same as a person's. If a deer wants to eat grass and a farmer wants to protect crops, people should not just kill the deer. A fairer way would be to put up fences or find gentle deterrents. This balances both wants instead of favoring one.

Of course, this equal consideration of interests is not universally accepted. Thinkers like Immanuel Kant, in Metaphysics of Morals, argue that animals lack reason and autonomy, and thus have no intrinsic moral worth. Under this view, treating animals well is not about respecting their rights or interests, but about cultivating our own moral character. Animal “rights,” then, are just projections of human values—and when human needs conflict with animal welfare, the former should always prevail. However, this view is limited—not only by the time in which Kant lived, but by its failure to recognize evolving moral intuitions. Today, when someone refrains from kicking a stray dog, it’s not simply because they’re fulfilling a duty to others; it’s often because they recognize the dog’s pain and feel empathy.

Even Kant’s framework unintentionally confirms that animals can suffer—because we compare their pain to that of humans when making moral judgments. From this, we don’t need to invoke rights. Instead, we reaffirm the central truth: animals suffer, and their interests must be respected. This both supports modern animal protection efforts and challenges the outdated reliance on rights-based thinking.

Meanwhile, we must treat animals well because of the need to have a healthy and balanced ecosystem. From an ecocentric point of view, animal welfare is about preserving biodiversity and ecological stability. Specifically, a wolf, a bee and a vulture each play a unique but connected role in their environment. For example, wolves regulate deer populations, so they don’t overgraze and allow vegetation to thrive, which in turn supports other species. Bees pollinate plants, they are essential to food chains and plant reproduction, including crops we need to survive. Vultures as scavengers eat decaying carcasses, preventing the spread of disease and keeping the environment clean. Thus, animal welfare is an ecological issue. For example, pandas are protected not because they have “rights” but because their extinction would harm biodiversity and ecosystem balance. Invasive species are often eradicated to protect local ecosystems; in those cases, their suffering is considered less important than the ecological damage they cause. This creates a moral dilemma: loving all animals doesn’t always mean saving every life. Killing a shark for sport or luxury food is clearly wrong. But in some cases, removing apex predators like sharks may be necessary to protect other marine species and balance the ecosystem. In those cases, it’s not about the shark’s individual right to life but the greater good of the ecosystem.

In fact, when we move beyond the human vs. non-human framework, the idea of animal rights begins to make more sense. The key to discussing animal rights is precisely to step outside the human-centered perspective. This is because we must constantly remind ourselves that protecting animals should not stem from a sense of human superiority. In this process of “protection,” the concept of the human must be decentered. From this wide view, the idea of rights looks like the notion of natural rights - these are basic freedoms that law or society does not provide. Being alive simply provides them. Humans have natural rights that people consider unable to take away and present everywhere, which means that people cannot remove them, regardless of whether a government or legal system is in place. These rights rest on the fact that humans have interests; they need food, shelter, safety along with well-being. Animals also have interests. They feel pain, look for comfort as well as need safe conditions to live. Animals also have what one can see as rights that people cannot remove - they do not need to earn these rights through thinking, working, or taking part in society. Birth provides these rights, just as it does for humans.

That said, we don’t need to give animals the same rights as humans to treat them with respect. Their ability to suffer, their role in ecosystems, and their basic needs are reason enough. Ecologically, some harm is inevitable: humans eat animals, and life exists within food chains. Still, modern societies seek gentler methods, like stunning before slaughter, to reduce pain. This shift reflects a deeper moral awareness: even when taking life, we must do so with care. By focusing on needs rather than rights, we adopt a more grounded and compassionate ethic. We value animals not for being like us, but for simply being sentient.

References

Bentham, J. (1789). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Quote appears in Chapter XVII, note 122.)

Regan, T. (1983). The case for animal rights. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals. New York: HarperCollins.